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Researchers have now produced a number of quantitative studies of the determinants of 
nuclear proliferation, using data on all known nuclear weapons programs. But while 
scholars have laid important groundwork in understanding the causes of nuclear pursuit, 
these studies are primarily focused on explaining rather than predicting proliferation. 
Drawing from existing quantitative work, this project uses statistical learning methods to 
construct a predictive model of proliferation, focusing on the ability of different nuclear 
proliferation theories to make accurate out-of-sample predictions. This study makes two 
contributions to the literature on nuclear proliferation and the larger policy debate. First, 
it identifies for the first time an empirically grounded set of nuclear “triggers”—
conditions under which countries are most likely to shift from latent nuclear capacity to 
a full-fledged nuclear weapons effort. Understanding these triggers has become 
increasingly important, as more states have begun to pursue a nuclear hedging strategy 
in which they seek dual-use nuclear capabilities without committing to a weapons 
program. Second, this study helps to reconcile conflicting empirical findings in the 
literature. Predictive analytics provide a new and useful way of understanding the 
substantive significance of existing empirical findings, and of comparing the relative 
importance of different theoretical approaches. 
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Assessing the risk of nuclear proliferation is a difficult job, made more challenging by the 
large amount of sometimes conflicting data available to the intelligence and policy 
communities. The analysis presented here attempts to contribute to these 
assessments by focusing on the predictive power of various indicators of 
proliferation risk. Where other studies examine specific cases of proliferation or 
restraint to gain insight about particular circumstances or causal processes, this project 
asks which indicators best predict a state’s decision to seek nuclear weapons in general. 
 
Analysts have examined a number of theories, causal models, or predictive indicators for 
nuclear proliferation, including a state’s underlying productive capacity, recent conflict 
behavior, foreign assistance, nuclear rivalry, alliance ties, and international institutions. 
	  
- Among these, the presence of a nuclear rival appears to be the 
strongest predictor of nuclear proliferation. This finding suggests that 
analysts should continue to use the nuclear behavior of rivals as a valuable 
indicator of proliferation risk, and also points to the continued relevance of 
concerns about proliferation cascades in the Middle East and East Asia. 
	  
- Two other factors—conflict behavior and the presence of a nuclear 
ally— significantly contribute to the accuracy of nuclear proliferation 
predictions. 
	  
- Considering a state’s membership in international institutions, its receipt of 
nuclear assistance, and the presence of latent capability did not significantly 
improve prediction in this analysis. 
	  
This analysis is merely a first step in bringing the new tools of “big data” to bear on the 
issue of proliferation. In the future, predictive analytics may serve as an important 
adjunct to expert knowledge of proliferation pathways, helping the intelligence and 
policy communities focus on the most relevant indicators of proliferation risk. 
Introduction 
In recent years, scholars have turned increasingly to quantitative tools to study the 
drivers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. These efforts complement a 
longstanding body of qualitative work, and add to an admirable diversity of theoretical 
approaches—from psychological (Hymans 2006), to bureaucratic (Sagan 1996), to 
normative (Rublee 2009). The study of nuclear proliferation does not lack for theories or 
for empirical findings.  
 Few scholars, however, have attempted to synthesize or adjudicate among 
disparate findings.1 This is not surprising—the incentives for proposing a novel theory or 
illuminating a new empirical association frequently outweigh those for efforts to 
understand collective progress of the field. But this gap makes it difficult to understand 
the extent of our collective knowledge of nuclear proliferation. The number of theories 
and findings also creates a substantial barrier when it comes to communicating with 
policy practitioners. With so many well-studied causes of nuclear proliferation—but no 
real sense of which is most important in any given case—it is difficult to translate 
academic findings into recommendations for counterproliferation policy. 
 In this study, we weigh a variety of factors that have been found to encourage or 
prevent nuclear proliferation, according to a simple metric: the ability of these factors to 
predict nuclear weapons proliferation out-of-sample. By examining the predictive validity 
of key explanatory variables, we cut through the literature’s accumulated findings of 
																																																						
1 For exceptions, see Gartzke and Kroenig (2009, 2014) and Sagan (2011).  For 
criticisms that the results of statistical tests of nuclear proliferation causes or effects may 
not be meaningful empirically, see Bell (2015) and Douglass and Lanoszka (2015). 
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statistical significance and ask, simply, “how much does this factor help us predict 
proliferation?” 
 This study has three parts. In the first part, we describe the state of empirical 
work on the causes of nuclear proliferation and highlight six contenders for the title of 
best indicator of a nuclear weapons program: capability, conflict behavior, nuclear 
assistance, rivalry, alliances, and institutions. In the second part, we describe our 
approach to measuring the predictive validity of these factors, and our efforts to address 
potential threats to the validity of this analysis. In the third part, we present our findings 
and suggest several avenues for subsequent research. 
Theories of nuclear proliferation 
The literature on nuclear proliferation proposes a number of potential drivers of state 
decisions to seek nuclear weapons. Here, we highlight six theories that scholars have 
previously examined using quantitative methods. In focusing on these six theories, we 
are clearly leaving out several influential explanations for state behavior, including 
theories based on international norms (Rublee 2009; Sagan 1996), domestic politics and 
regime type (Sagan 1996; Way and Weeks 2014), and economic liberalization (Solingen 
1994). We also fail to address directly the relative importance of specific 
counterproliferation policies, such as international sanctions (Haggard and Nolan 2012; 
Miller 2014) or military action (Kreps and Fuhrmann 2011). We leave for future 




Nuclear weapons development requires significant indigenous capability. Large-scale 
weapons programs draw on a country’s financial resources, of course, but also call for 
trained scientists and engineers, access to uranium reserves, the ability to work with 
specialty metals, and the sustained attention of both political authorities and a large 
cadre of competent administrators. The size of the undertaking might be expected to 
deter all but the most technically capable states from launching nuclear weapons 
programs. Why expend the resources and risk international opposition when the 
successful development of a nuclear weapon seems so unlikely? 
 Certainly, a number of states have opted to forego weapons because of the 
substantial cost of proliferating, but there also are several examples of states that began 
nuclear weapons programs while lacking almost all of the required resources. Pakistani 
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto famously said in 1965 that if India develops nuclear 
weapons, “we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.” 
And the spread of civilian nuclear technology has almost certainly significantly reduced 
the cost of a weapons program since the early days of the nuclear age. States that 
already operate a nuclear power plant, for example, can apply the same technology to 
the production of fissile material for a nuclear weapon. 
 Several scholars have identified a strong link between supply-side factors—
including underlying state capability—and a country’s likelihood of seeking nuclear 
weapons. Singh and Way (2004), for example, find that increasing GDP per capita 
increases the risk that a low-GDP state will pursue nuclear weapons, and Jo and Gartzke 
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(2007) show that latent nuclear capacity is significantly associated with weapons 
programs. Gartzke and Kroenig (2009) thus conclude that supply-side factors—to 
include state capability—“are among the most important determinants of nuclear 
proliferation.” 
Conflict behavior 
A state’s concern about its own security is likely to be a fundamental driver of nuclear 
weapons pursuit (Sagan 1996). States justify the expense and risk associated with 
seeking weapons largely in terms of the security benefits they believe will follow from 
nuclear acquisition. Countries that have been more frequent participants in international 
conflict—or that expect to be involved in conflict in the future—will find the cost of 
nuclear weapons development easier to justify. It is no surprise, then, that multiple 
studies have shown a strong association between a state’s conflict behavior and the 
pursuit of nuclear weapons (Fuhrmann 2009; Jo and Gartzke 2007).2 
Nuclear assistance 
Advocates of supply-side theories of nuclear proliferation have focused on the provision 
of nuclear assistance to would-be proliferants. This assistance can take several forms. 
Supplier states may provide sensitive assistance that contributes directly to weapons 
design or fissile material production efforts.3 States may sign nuclear cooperation 
agreements that facilitate the transfer of civilian nuclear technology to be used for power 
																																																						
2 This is not a universal finding, however. See, for example, Brown and Kaplow (2014). 
3 The number of potential suppliers of sensitive assistance has been increasing in recent 
years. See Braun and Chyba (2004). 
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production or other non-weapons purposes. And states may receive multilateral nuclear 
assistance from international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. 
Each form of nuclear assistance has the potential to make a nuclear weapons 
program less costly. Even civilian nuclear assistance can have this effect; the dual-use 
nature of nuclear power programs means that the same technology can be applied to 
research and development of nuclear weapons if the recipient state makes the decision to 
seek a bomb. By lowering the barriers to a successful nuclear weapons effort, nuclear 
assistance may make states more likely to take the initial step and launch a nuclear 
weapons program. Studies that have examined the role of nuclear assistance in 
encouraging proliferation have found that sensitive assistance, bilateral civilian 
assistance, and multilateral civilian assistance are strongly associated with the decisions 
of states to seek nuclear weapons (Brown and Kaplow 2014; Fuhrmann 2009; Kroenig 
2009). 
Nuclear rivalry 
Most nuclear weapons states have joined the nuclear club at least partially in response to 
the nuclear pursuit of another state. The Manhattan Project was driven partly by fears of 
German nuclear efforts. The Soviet Union sought weapons, in part, to keep step with the 
United States. China’s nuclear program spurred India’s program, which in turn pushed 
Pakistani nuclear development. If nuclear rivalry is a primary driver of nuclear weapons 
programs, then we should worry about proliferation cascades or dominoes, in which the 
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pursuit of nuclear weapons by one state prompts weapons programs in others, which 
lead to programs in other states, and so on. 
 Quantitative findings on the role of nuclear rivalry, however, have surprisingly 
been less than emphatic. In most of his quantitative models, Fuhrmann (2009) finds that 
having a nuclear rival makes states more likely to seek their own nuclear weapons. Other 
studies, however, find this relationship is not robust to multiple model specifications 
(Bleek and Lorber 2014; Brown and Kaplow 2014; Kroenig 2009). Jo and Gartzke 
(2007) report the counterintuitive finding that states are actually less likely to seek 
nuclear weapons when they have nuclear rivals.4  The mixed nature of existing evidence 
is grounds for additional analysis, something we address here.   
Nuclear alliances 
Faced with external threats, states may seek nuclear weapons for protection, or they may 
turn to allies that already possess nuclear weapons. This latter option, if available, may 
be significantly cheaper than embarking on one’s own nuclear weapons program. To the 
extent that these two strategies are substitutes, we might expect that countries that are 
able to rely on the “nuclear umbrella” of an ally should be less likely to seek nuclear 
weapons themselves. At times, the US nuclear umbrella has been explicitly exercised as a 
tool of nonproliferation—a means intended to convince allied states that they do not 
need to develop their own nuclear deterrent. 
 Here, too, quantitative studies of nuclear proliferation have come to different 
conclusions. Fuhrmann (2009) and Brown and Kaplow (2014) find no relationship 
																																																						
4 This result may, they note, be attributable to concerns about preventive conflict. 
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between the presence of a nuclear ally and the likelihood that a state seeks nuclear 
weapons. Other work identifies some nonproliferation benefit to a nuclear umbrella, but 
not in all model specifications (Jo and Gartzke 2007; Kroenig 2009; Singh and Way 
2004). In a reanalysis of these studies, using modified data, Bleek and Lorber (2014) 
find strong support for nuclear alliances in discouraging proliferation. 
Institutions 
Since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into force in 
1970, only four states have acquired nuclear weapons, and no state has acquired nuclear 
weapons while also a member of the NPT.5 For some, this is strong evidence of the 
effectiveness of the NPT in constraining state behavior. The NPT has even been hailed as 
one of the most successful security treaties in world history (Cirincione 2008), chiefly 
because it is seen as a key factor in keeping the number of nuclear weapons states far 
below the dire predictions of experts in the 1960’s.  
 Of course, others are less impressed. Detailed case studies of nuclear restraint—
the decisions of high-risk states to forgo weapons—have found little role for the NPT 
(Reiss 1995; Rublee 2009). Many argue that the NPT is in crisis, and that whatever 
constraining power it once had is now eroding (Perkovich 2006; Sauer 2006; Williams 
and Wolfstahl 2005). At least one analyst has suggested that the NPT is likely to do more 
harm than good in the future (Wesley 2005). Summarizing the state of research on the 
impact of the NPT, Potter (2010) laments that “NPT advocates and critics alike typically 
																																																						
5 One state that acquired nuclear weapons, South Africa, later gave them up. North 
Korea only reached nuclear weapons status after withdrawing from the NPT.  India, 
Israel, and Pakistan are nuclear capable countries that never joined the NPT.  
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assert their preferred views about the merits of the Treaty and its (in)dispensable 
contribution in retarding the spread of nuclear weapons.” 
 A number of quantitative studies have examined the role of the NPT in at least a 
cursory way. These analyses typically include as a control variable a measure of whether 
a state is a member of the NPT in a given year. This variable, when included in a model 
of nuclear pursuit, is often significantly associated with a decreased likelihood of 
proliferation (Bleek and Lorber 2014; Brown and Kaplow 2014; Fuhrmann 2009; Jo and 
Gartzke 2007). As these authors are quick to acknowledge, however, the significant 
negative correlation between NPT membership and nuclear weapons programs does not 
tell us much about the independent role of the NPT, because there is likely to be a 
significant selection effect with regard to treaty membership. If states are more likely to 
join the NPT when they have no intention of proliferating, as we might expect, then this 
correlation may have little to do with the constraining power of the treaty.6  
The predictive power of proliferation theory 
Most quantitative studies of nuclear proliferation aim to identify a causal link between a 
particular factor and a state’s propensity to seek nuclear weapons. In service of this goal, 
scholars conduct some form of regression analysis, and report whether variables of 
interest—representing their key causal factors—achieve statistical and perhaps 
substantive significance. These analyses, moreover, make some attempt to account for 
alternative explanations for their results, often by controlling for confounding variables 
																																																						
6 For an analysis that seeks to avoid this selection problem, see Kaplow (2013). 
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in a regression model. This mode of analysis is useful in understanding whether an 
individual factor affects the outcome of interest.7 
 We take a somewhat different approach. We make no attempt to test hypotheses 
or identify, except in an indirect way, individual factors that matter for nuclear 
proliferation. Instead we inquire, with the above theories as our guide, how well one can 
predict proliferation. How much do each of the above theories contribute to our ability to 
make accurate predictions?  
 A focus on out-of-sample predictive validity has several advantages. First, it moves 
us away from the questionable emphasis in the quantitative literature on statistical 
significance as a metric for a successful result. Second, testing the performance of models 
within our data sample—as we do, for example, in traditional regression models—is a 
kind of teaching to the test. This practice risks overfitting our models and mistaking 
idiosyncrasies in our data for real-world trends. Finally, framing our results in terms of 
predictive validity helps to bridge the gap between academics and policy practitioners, 
positioning quantitative models as a kind of analogy to the work that policy and 
intelligence analysts do routinely. Rather than asking policy professionals to interpret a 
set of regression results, we can express our findings in terms of how well we were able 
to make predictions beyond the data used to construct our models. 
																																																						
7 We are sympathetic to, but do not address here, the larger critique of this analytic 
approach and its reliance on statistical significance as an indicator of a worthy result. 
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 Below, we describe our analysis of the out-of-sample predictive validity of six 
major theories of nuclear proliferation, including the variables we use and our modeling 
and cross-validation strategy.  
Data and variables 
Our data are structured as a pooled time series with the country-year as the unit of 
analysis. Each observation in the data represents an individual state in a given year. Our 
data run from 1945—the dawn of the nuclear age—to 2010. The dependent variable in 
this analysis is a dichotomous measure of whether a state begins a nuclear weapons 
program in a given year, using data updated from Jo and Gartzke (2007).8 Following 
some in the quantitative nuclear literature, we drop all observations from the data once a 
state has begun a nuclear weapons program (or acquired a weapon). The state reenters 
the dataset after its program ends (or its nuclear weapons have been given up), and it is 
once again at risk of pursuing nuclear weapons. This data structure makes for a much 
harder test of the predictive power of theories of nuclear proliferation, because the best 
predictor of whether or not a state will have a nuclear weapons program next year is 
whether a state has a nuclear weapons program this year. By eliminating from the data 
any hints provided by the presence of an existing program, we make prediction 
significantly more difficult. 
 We use three variables to measure a state’s latent nuclear weapons capability. 
First, we use the country’s real GDP per capita to capture its overall level of national 
resources (Gleditsch 2002). Second, we use a seven-point composite measure of latent 
																																																						
8 Using alternative pursuit dates from Singh and Way (2004) yields similar results. 
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nuclear capacity from Jo and Gartzke (2007). This measure runs only through 2001, 
however, so we assume for the purposes of this analysis that states maintain the same 
level of underlying nuclear capacity from 2001 through 2010. This assumption is 
probably not far from the truth—the individual components of the Jo and Gartzke 
measure, such as uranium deposits, change infrequently. Third, we use a dichotomous 
measure of nuclear production capability—a dummy variable equal to one when a state 
produces any electricity from nuclear power in a given year (World Bank 2015). States 
with civilian nuclear infrastructure may find it far easier to pursue development of 
nuclear weapons. 
 To capture conflict behavior, we use a simple five-year moving average of the 
number of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) in which a state was involved (Ghosn, 
Palmer, and Bremer 2004). Alternative operationalizations, including the count of MIDs 
over the last five years, three years, and one year, and dummy variables representing 
MID involvement over these timeframes, produce roughly the same results. 
 Two variables represent theories of nuclear assistance in our analysis. First, we use 
Fuhrmann’s (2009) measure of civilian nuclear cooperation—the cumulative number of 
nuclear cooperation agreements signed by a state. Second, we also include in our models 
a measure of multilateral nuclear assistance. This is equal to the number of fuel cycle-
related technical cooperation projects—administered by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency—in which a state participated in a given year (Brown and Kaplow 2014). 
 Nuclear rivalry may also help to predict proliferation. We include in our models a 
dichotomous variable set to one if a state had a rival with a nuclear weapon in a given 
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year, using rivalry data from Thompson and Dreyer (2011). Alternative variable 
specifications substitute the presence of a rival with a nuclear weapons program—rather 
than one that has already obtained at least one nuclear weapon—but the results are the 
same. 
 To capture the role of alliances in predicting proliferation, we adopt a 
dichotomous variable set to one if a state has a defense pact with a nuclear state in a 
given year, using alliance data from the Correlates of War Project (Gibler and Sarkees 
2004). 
 We follow common practice in this literature and measure the impact of 
institutions with a dummy variable set to one if a state is a member of the NPT in a given 
year. NPT membership data is drawn from Carcelli et al. (2014). 
 To facilitate comparisons with existing models of nuclear proliferation, we also 
include in our models a cubic polynomial of the number of years since a state last 
pursued nuclear weapons or, for those states that have never had a weapons program, 
the number of years since 1945. This variable—equivalent to the peace years variable 
often used in studies of international conflict—addresses temporal autocorrelation in the 
logit and probit models frequently used in this literature (Carter and Signorino 2010). 
For our purposes, this variable also has a useful substantive interpretation as a stand-in 
for the history of a state’s nuclear adventures. The behavior of states that recently 
engaged in nuclear weapons development may rightly fall under more scrutiny than 
those that have been good nuclear citizens since the start of the nuclear age. 
Statistical learning model 
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We test the predictive accuracy of these variables using a statistical learning model—the 
support vector machine (SVM). An SVM represents data as points in multidimensional 
space, developing a set of statistical rules that maximize the gap between points of one 
type (states that seek nuclear weapons) and points of another type (states that forgo 
weapons programs). Different statistical learning methods enjoy different levels of 
predictive accuracy depending on the underlying data structure. We make no 
representation about the relative effectiveness of SVMs versus other common statistical 
learning methods such as neural networks or random forests; we limit ourselves to SVMs 
for simplicity. Future work could apply alternative statistical learning models or 
supplement our SVMs with a model-averaging strategy such as committee methods or 
bootstrap aggregation, in which predictions are averaged across bootstrap samples to 
reduce variance (Hastie, Tibshirani, and Friedman 2001). 
Statistical learning approaches are less frequently employed in political science, 
but are commonly used in computer science and statistics. Statistical learning is 
particularly well suited to problems in which the relationships between variables are 
highly conditional, as they are likely to be in the case of nuclear proliferation. The 
pursuit of nuclear weapons is a rare event. Thus even the strongest drivers of 
proliferation probably exert relatively little influence on proliferation decisions in the 
vast majority of cases. But in states that are at high risk of proliferating—that is, in the 
cases we care most about—these factors may matter a great deal.9 The linear regression 
																																																						
9 See Beck, King, and Zeng (2000) for an application of this argument to international 
conflict. 
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models and their close relatives (such as logit and probit) that are used most often in the 
quantitative nuclear proliferation literature are not flexible enough to capture complex 
non-linear relationships that are likely to be present in these data. 
Cross-validation and predictive metrics 
We examine predictive accuracy using a 3-fold cross-validation procedure of the kind 
commonly used in the computer science and machine learning literatures (Arlot and 
Celisse 2010). We divide our data randomly into three parts.10 Two parts of the dataset 
are used as training data to construct the model, while the third part is used to test the 
predictive power of the model. The divided data is then shuffled and the process 
repeated, so that each piece of the original dataset serves once as the test data. To avoid 
any bias introduced by the initial division of the data, we repeat this entire process 10 
times using different random subsamples and average the results.  
 The fact that nuclear proliferation is an exceedingly rare event—only about 0.3 
percent of observations in our data correspond with initiation of a nuclear weapons 
development program—complicates this process in two important ways. First, statistical 
models are constructed to best fit all of the data in the training sample. When that data 
is overwhelmingly an example of non-nuclear pursuit, the best fitting model is likely to 
err in the direction of explaining those more prevalent cases. That is, the model we 
select, almost by definition, is designed to explain the more frequent case in the dataset. 
This issue of class imbalance is a familiar problem in the computer science literature 
(Sun, Wong, and Kamel 2009). 
																																																						
10 2-fold cross validation yields similar results. 
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While there is no single solution to this problem, we can mitigate the issue by 
oversampling the rare class in the data or undersampling the prevalent class. Here, we 
do both, adopting an algorithm known as SMOTE (synthetic minority oversampling 
technique) (Chawla et al. 2002). This algorithm works by adjusting the training data for 
our models. It adds to the number of cases of nuclear pursuit in the data, generating 
new, synthetic cases using a nearest neighbor method. It also reduces the number of 
non-pursuit cases in the data through systematic undersampling. The result is a more 
balanced sample of cases in the training data, facilitating better prediction of the rare 
event. Note that this procedure has not been used to adjust the out-of-sample testing 
data that is set aside and then used to evaluate predictive accuracy for the model. 
Rare events also complicate the task of measuring predictive success. Overall 
accuracy—how many of the test data points the model successfully predicted—is a poor 
measure of success when rare events are involved, because the model can achieve very 
high levels of overall accuracy without providing any leverage against the problem of 
interest. A model that always predicts that states will not proliferate would accurately 
predict more than 99 percent of cases in our dataset, but such a model is not particularly 
useful as a guide to countering proliferation. 
As an alternative, we adopt two metrics that are sensitive to changes in the 
model’s ability to predict proliferation—rather than just non-proliferation. First, we 
examine the area under the ROC curve (AUC) (Swets 1988). On one axis of the ROC 
curve is the rate of false positives—the number of cases in which the model incorrectly 
predicted that a state would seek weapons, divided by the total number of cases of 
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nuclear non-pursuit. On the other axis is the true-positive rate—the number of cases in 
which the model correctly predicted proliferation divided by the total number of cases of 
nuclear weapons programs. A perfect model, one that correctly predicts all cases, will 
have an AUC of 1. 
As a second metric for predictive success, we use the F1 score. This metric 
balances two elements of the model’s predictions. The first is the model’s positive 
predictive value, the share of “yes” predictions that turn out to be correct. The second is 
the model’s sensitivity, the share of real proliferation episodes that the model correctly 
identifies. The F1 score is the harmonic mean of these two factors. F1 scores closer to 1 
indicate a greater level of predictive success, while scores closer to zero indicate more 
incorrect predictions of the feature—nuclear proliferation—that we care most about. 
Testing predictive power 
Our overall results show fairly strong predictive power for the full model of proliferation. 
The SVM with all variables included has an average AUC of 0.76. This compares quite 
favorably to a naïve model made up just of the cubic polynomial of time since the last 
weapons program, which has an AUC of 0.15. But the AUC metric includes model 
performance in predicting negative cases—non-nuclear pursuit—as well as positive 
cases. A less rosy picture is presented by the F1 score, with an average value of 0.05 
across the full model. 
 These metrics are more meaningful when the contributions of individual theories 
of nuclear proliferation are considered. Table 1 shows the results for each metric when 
adding a given set of variables into an otherwise fully specified SVM. That is, each row 
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Table 1: Predictive power of theories of nuclear proliferation 
     
 
AUC Percent of AUC F1 score 
Percent of 
F1 score 
Full model 0.764 100% 0.053 100% 
     Capability 0.022 2.96% 0.004 8.16% 
Conflict behavior 0.035 4.80% 0.006 12.77% 
Nuclear assistance 0.009 1.19% 0.003 6.00% 
Rivalry 0.031 4.23% 0.011 26.19% 
Alliances 0.017 2.28% 0.005 10.42% 
Institutions -0.022 -2.80% 0.001 1.92% 
          
Average results from 10 runs of a 3-fold cross-validation procedure using a 
support vector machine. Values indicate the change in the specified metric 
when adding the given variables to an otherwise fully specified model. 
can be interpreted as the contribution that an individual theory makes to the out-of-
sample prediction of nuclear weapons programs. These values are also expressed as a 
percentage of the total metric, and can be seen as the increase (or decrease) in predictive 
performance we gain from adopting that theory of nuclear proliferation in our analysis.  
 The stand-out predictor among these theories is the presence of a nuclear rival. 
Adding rivalry to the SVM increases the AUC by more than four percent and the F1 score 
by more than 25 percent, on average. While nuclear rivalry has not fared well in 
omnibus quantitative tests of the correlates of proliferation, here it excels. This is not 
unusual—the factors that matter most for proliferation in an absolute sense may not be 
those that make the greatest contribution to efforts to make predictions out of sample. 
This finding suggests that the nuclear behavior of rivals should continue to be adopted as 
a valuable indicator of proliferation risk, and also points to the continued relevance of 
concerns about proliferation cascades in the Middle East and elsewhere. 
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The predictive power of alliance-based theories of nuclear proliferation also is 
somewhat surprising given the mixed findings of the wider quantitative proliferation 
literature. Adding a measure of nuclear umbrellas to the SVM increases the F1 score by 
more than ten percent.  
Conflict behavior is also a significant predictor of state decisions to seek nuclear 
weapons. Considering a state’s recent history of dispute involvement increases AUC by 
almost five percent, on average, and the F1 score by more than 12 percent. This finding is 
more consistent with the existing quantitative literature on nuclear proliferation, which 
sees a strong correlation between conflict history and propensity to seek nuclear 
weapons. 
The predictive power of supply-side theories of nuclear proliferation is weaker in 
our tests than other theoretical approaches. These factors seem to be less useful in 
distinguishing between high-risk cases of proliferation. Measure of latent capability—
GDP, nuclear capacity, and nuclear power production—add only three percent to AUC 
and 8 percent to the F1 score. And measures of nuclear assistance—civilian nuclear 
cooperation agreements and multilateral nuclear aid—do even worse by these metrics. 
These findings are interesting given the collective focus in the policy community on 
issues of nuclear latency and the risks associated with indigenous nuclear infrastructure 
in countries of concern. Of course, supply-side factors probably matter a great deal in 
terms of a state’s decision to seek weapons, but in this analysis they fall short as effective 
indicators of nuclear interest. 
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Finally, institutional theories of nuclear non-proliferation do especially poorly in 
our predictive tests. Adding a variable representing NPT membership to the SVM actually 
diminishes its ability to predict nuclear pursuit according to the AUC metric, and has 
little effect on the F1 score. This speaks directly to the NPT’s inability to effectively signal 
state intentions one way or the other. In some ways, the treaty is a victim of its own 
success. Because nearly every state is now a member of the institution—only India, 
Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and newly independent South Sudan remain outside the 
treaty—it does not tell us much about the nuclear intentions of its members. 
Conclusion 
Unlike other quantitative studies of nuclear proliferation—which primarily seek to 
identify causal links between some explanatory variable and state decisions to seek 
nuclear weapons—this project focuses on the value of different factors as indicators of 
proliferation risk. In doing so, it provides a testing ground for comparing extant theories 
of proliferation and asking which is most useful in predicting proliferation out of sample.  
 This approach can be useful to policymakers because it mimics the real-world 
analytic process. We train our analysis on the body of data that we have available, then 
use that analysis to predict future events. Predictive validity is a kind of substantive 
significance—a way to ensure that our findings are not chasing the noise in our data, but 
rather represent some relationship that exists in the real world. Predictive models excel 
at showing us which factors are best able to distinguish between the borderline cases of 
proliferation—the cases of greatest policy concern. These factors are not usually the most 
obvious drivers of nuclear weapons programs; it is the more subtle and conditional 
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relationships that are likely to matter most in accurately predicting proliferation. These 
factors become strong candidates for new indicators of proliferation that might be used 
by the intelligence and policy communities.  
 Our analysis need not end with these simple metrics of predictive success, 
however. The output of our predictive model is not merely a set of yes-or-no predictions. 
Instead, of each state in each year, the model assesses the probability that the state will 
pursue nuclear weapons under a particular set of conditions. This feature of the 
predictive model allows for a range of useful analysis in future work. For example, we 
might investigate the dogs that did not bark—states that the model assesses had a strong 
likelihood of proliferating but which did not actually choose to seek weapons. Further 
examination might reveal that these states share particular characteristics that help to 
mitigate the risk of proliferation. We might also look in more detail at the model’s false 
negatives—the states that the model did not think would proliferate, but which 
ultimately sought nuclear weapons. Subjecting these cases to extra scrutiny might help 
analysts to better understand assumptions that are not being made explicit in the study 
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